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ABSTRACT - Each monetary strategy with its targeting has its strengths and disadvantages. 
However, exchange rate targeting can be very useful especially at the beginning of transition process 
as it helps to stabilise inflation. We try to evaluate effectiveness of exchange rate targeting in the 
Slovak Republic and in the Czech Republic using statistic methods. Our conclusions can serve as an 
experience to other countries that are e.g. just at the beginning of their transition process. 
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Targeting in a monetary strategy 
Central banks have several monetary strategies at their disposal. Among the most 
common we can mention; exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, implicit inflation 
targeting and explicit inflation targeting. According some economists e.g. Patat (2002, 88), a 
final goal of a monetary policy should be first of all price stability. It is not in a conflict with 
other real economic goals at least not in a long term. The logic of Patat idea is described in 
the picture 1: 
 
Picture 1. Positive effects of the price stability Targeting 
 
 
Source: Patat, 2002 
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Consequently, it may seem that the most suitable monetary strategy would be inflation 
targeting. However, it is not possible to apply inflation targeting in every country and at the 
beginning of transition process. It is believed, that even exchange rate targeting can help to 
stabilise turbulent inflation rate at the beginning of transitions.  
Aspects of exchange rate targeting 
In the case of exchange rate targeting, exchange rate serves as a nominal anchor. Final 
goal is low and stable inflation rate.  
A central bank applying exchange rate targeting tries to ensure stability of its exchange 
rate through interest rate changes and direct foreign exchange interventions. Stabilised 
currency should enable to “import” low inflation from a reference country. In general, the 
reference economy is usually a developed country with stable macroeconomic indicators 
(Rybková 2005, 23).  
A central bank usually applies the targeting when it uses fixed peg arrangements as an 
exchange rate system. This system can be divided into three subcategories: 
1. crawling peg, 
2. nominal exchange rate with wide or narrow oscillation bands, 
3. central parity depending on one reference currency or more currencies (currency 
basket). 
Currency basket can be very useful measurement in small and open economies at the 
beginning of their transition process. Foreign currencies in the basket should be chosen 
according to their importance in external commerce with a chosen small and open economy. 
E.g. in the case of Thailand it could be Japanese yen and American dollar.  
In the Slovak Republic, currency basket comprised from the very beginning of the its 
existence, i.e. since 1993 five currencies: USD (American dollar) 49,6 %, DEM (German mark) 
36,1 %, ATS (Austrian shilling) 3,7 %, CHF (Swiss frank) 9 % and FRF (French frank) 2,9 %. 
However, shortly afterwards, it was obvious that only two currencies had real importance in 
external commerce of the Slovak Republic. In 1994, currency basket comprised only two 
currencies: USD (American dollar) 40 % and DEM (German mark) 60 %. The Czech Republic 
applied the same basket with the similar ratio: USD (American dollar) 35 % and DEM 
(German mark) 65 %. Consequently, we can expect quite strong relationship between 
inflation rate in Germany and inflation rate in Slovak respectively in the Czech Republic.  
Probably the most important advantage of the exchange rate targeting is the positive 
effect of a reference country on inflation rate. The targeting can be recommended in the case 
of small and open economies where exchange rate influence significantly price level 
evolution. The weakness of the targeting can be an important drop of monetary policy 
autonomy. There is also a risk of unfavourable supply or demand shocks from the reference 
country to country in transition. Another disadvantage can be lost of signals concerning 
market creating of domestic interest rates (Rybková 2005, 22).  
Advantages and disadvantages of the exchange rate targeting can be summarised as 
follows: 
Main advantages of the strategy based on exchange rate targeting are following (Nell, 
2004, 8): 
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• Central bank uses automatic mechanism:   
a. Depreciating factors cause monetary policy restriction.  
b. Appreciating factors lead to monetary policy release.  
• Central bank is characterised by high transparency. Consequently, time 
inconsistency is lower. 
• Advantage for transition countries aiming disinflation is that exchange rate 
targeting is good signal for creation of private sector expectations.  
Disadvantages of this strategy are e.g. following: 
• Domestic interests are less followed.  
• Economy looses its independency in monetary field.  
• Economic chocks are transferred from external chocks more sensitively.  
• Vulnerability caused by financial crises is higher.  
• Capital controls are necessary in order to prevent speculative attacks in the capital 
field.    
Effectiveness of exchange rate targeting in the Slovak and in the Czech Republic in 1990’ 
is analysed in the following part of the paper. 
Exchange rate targeting in the Slovak and in the Czech Republic 
We have tried to test relationship between inflation rate in the reference country i.e. 
Germany and inflation rate in the Slovak Republic and in the Czech Republic during 1990’. 
In other words, if imported inflation from Germany helped to stabilise inflation evolution 
during transition process in the two countries while their central banks were applying 
exchange rate targeting. We have used statistic methods in evaluation of this relationship.  
The case of the Czech Republic 
Time series of inflation rates in Germany and in the Czech Republic were tested by 
Rybková (2005, 24). It is represented in the following figure: 
 
Figure 1. Relation between CPI in the Czech Republic and Germany 
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Source: Rybková (2005, 24) 
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It is obvious from the graphic that time series of inflation rate in the Czech Republic is 
more and more similar to the inflation evolution in Germany over the observed period. 
Initial inflation pressures had been stabilised. The graphic ends at the end of the year 1997 as 
it is end of exchange rate targeting in the Czech Republic. Since 1998 the targeting was 
substituted by implicit inflation targeting and later on by explicit inflation targeting.  
Adjusted coefficient of determination adj R² reached 95,89 that is high value of correlation 
between the two time series (Rybková 2005, 24). 
Yet, it is important to test if it is not only seeming correlation. It is possible to use 
regressive analysis of residuals of both time series to deny seeming correlation. Figure shows 
that there are neither cyclical nor seasonal elements. Thus, residuals can be calculated as 
values of time series minus values of trend function. It was possible to deny hypothesis on 
independence of residuals. In conclusion; residual values of both time series are dependent 
and original assumption about dependence of both time series was correct (Rybková 2005, 
25). 
The case of the Slovak Republic 
We have tried to evaluate time series of inflation rates in Germany in comparison with 
Slovakia:  
 
Figure 2. Relation between CPI in the Slovak Republic and Germany 
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Source: own representation according to Statistical office of  the Slovak Republic data 
 
Observation ends in December 1998 when National Bank of Slovakia stopped to apply 
fixed peg arrangements and exchange rate targeting. Slovakia lost its nominal anchor, 
however central bank adopted new nominal anchor only since 2000. Consequently, Slovakia 
was without any nominal anchor during one year. This situation was extremely dangerous. 
Despite very cautious and rational policy of the National Bank of Slovakia since its creation 
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in 1993 till nowadays, this measurement was very risky. However, fortunately, nothing 
malignant happened to Slovak economy during this period. 
Evolution of this comparison is very similar as it was in the case of comparison between 
German and Czech inflation. Even we can prove that the correlation between the time series 
is high as the value of adjusted coefficient of determination adj R² is 93,24. It is little bit lower 
than in the case of the Czech Republic. It can be explained by higher volume of external 
commerce between the Czech Republic and Germany than between Slovakia and Germany. 
Consequently, ration in the currency baskets was slightly different. 
Analogically, we tested if the correlation is not only seeming one. Using trend analysis, 
trend function and F-test we can deny hypothesis on independent residuals. As they are 
independent, we can confirm original idea that time series concerning inflation rate time 
series in Germany and in Slovakia are dependent. 
Overall evaluation of exchange rate targeting  
Exchange rate targeting had positive effect on stabilisation of inflation rate in Slovakia 
and in the Czech Republic. The targeting can be recommended also in the case of other 
countries especially if they are at the beginning of their transition process. Moderate 
evolution of inflation in the Slovak Republic (SR) and Czech Republic (CZ) at the beginning 
of transition process since 1993 to 1998 can be observed in comparison with chosen countries 
in the table 1.  
 
Picture 2. Inflation rate (consumer prices) – Europe, in January 2008 
 
Source: Index Mundi 
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Up to now, inflation rate in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic was comparatively 
low. Consequently, we consider application of exchange rate targeting and currency basket 
to be very successful. It created favourable fundaments for macroeconomic stability. Even 
today, the two countries are among the economies with low inflation rate in Europe as it can 
be seen in the picture 2. In January 2008, inflation rate was 2% in Germany, 2,6% in the Czech 
Republic, 2,7% in the Slovak Republic, 4,1% in Poland, 6,6% in Romania, 7,8% in Hungary 
and Bulgaria. 
 
Table 1. Average annual inflation in chosen countries, 1993 – 1998 
 
Country SR CZ Slovenia Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria 
Inflation, % 10,6 11,3 15,6 20,9 23,6 123,7 282,1 
Source: ILO Yearbook of Statistics 1998 
 
Success of exchange rate targeting in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic was underlined 
by parallel application of monetary targeting, i.e. targeting of monetary aggregates. This 
combination seems to be very efficient in the case of both countries and can be recommended 
also for other countries especially at the beginning of their transition process. 
Exchange rate targeting should have positive effect in transition countries on inflation 
stabilisation if the currency is anchored to a suitable foreign currency. However, evolution in 
financial markets, bank sector, monetary instruments and macroeconomic stabilisation of the 
transition country enable application of inflation targeting gradually. 
Aspects of inflation targeting 
Another possibility how to stabilize inflation evolution in an economy is inflation 
targeting. Inflation targeting represents a monetary strategy based on absence of 
intermediate monetary policy objectives. Central bank aims final goal that is again low and 
stable inflation rate. This goal should be attained directly through monetary instruments, 
usually through interest rates.  
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, Posen (1999) define inflation targeting as a framework for 
monetary policy that is realized through public announcement of official quantified goals (or 
scales) for inflation rate. The rate is quantified for one or several future periods. This goal 
quantification should be accompanied by an explicit confirmation that low and stable 
inflation is a long-term primary monetary policy goal. 
Five basic elements of inflation targeting (Nell 2004, 12): 
• Public announcement of mid term inflation goals by a numeric way. 
• Price stability is a primary, final and long-term goal. Role of other goals is just 
secondary and they are taken into account only for short term. 
• Transparent and clear communication of plans, objectives and decisions towards 
public. Monetary measurements are publicly announced too. All changes in 
monetary policy are explained to economic agents. 
   Economic Analysis (2009, Vol. 42, No. 3-4, 18-28)
 
24
• High rate of monetary authority accountancy. 
• Economic agents that know precisely central bank strategy behave consistently 
with primary goal and consequently it fortifies activities of a monetary authority.  
Conditions for an implementation of inflation targeting are following (Nell 2004, 13-18): 
• Central bank should have sufficient level of independence and thus it can fully 
bear responsibility for achieved results 
• Central bank has to give up other nominal anchors in order to avoid a conflict 
between previous nominal anchors and price stability as a new anchor and new 
final goal. That is the reason why fixed exchange rate system usually is not 
compatible with inflation targeting. 
• Declaration of price stability as a final goal itself does not express precisely what 
does it mean in fact. It is necessary to determinate an explicit numeric inflation 
target.  
• Inflation targeting is characterised by dependence of goals and by independence 
of instruments. Inflation targeting should be announced together by central bank 
as well as by government. That would mean indirect commitment of government 
to fortify inflation targeting by its fiscal policy.     
• Fiscal policy should not be dominating policy in an economy. That is very 
common feature in transition countries. Consequently, there is bigger risk of high 
inflation because of direct and indirect financing of state budget deficit. Thus, 
pumping of central bank finance by government should be restricted (restrictions 
of so called credit links). Monetary and fiscal policy should be coordinated. It 
means that fiscal inflation pressure should be eliminated in practise (Brucháčová 
2000, 28).  
• Accountancy, transparency and comprehension of monetary strategy.  
• There should be certain assumptions for financial stability, financial system and 
institutional development in the economy. It enables independency in monetary 
instrument application. More developed financial markets enable better functions 
of the channels of monetary transmission and thus, more effective application of 
monetary policy. 
• Central bank should be able to predict future evolution of macroeconomic 
indicators to aim an inflation goal in a more realistic way. The more precisely is 
evolution predicted, the more adequate monetary instrument is chosen. Correct 
predictions require sufficient understanding of effects of monetary transmission 
channels; sufficiently long time ranks of macroeconomic variables and above all 
low sensibility of economy to different external and transformation chocks.   
• External stability, i.e. limited fluctuations of exchange rate is important as well. 
Monetary strategy in the form of inflation targeting can be realised in two modifications: 
a) Explicit inflation targeting (“full-fledged inflation targeting”) 
b) Implicit inflation targeting (“light inflation targeting“) 
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Explicit inflation targeting 
Central bank fulfils all five above-mentioned elements of inflation targeting in this 
monetary strategy. Monetary authority predicts explicitly inflation rate and announces 
explicitly and publicly numeric value of inflation goal in mid term. It meets its engagements 
strictly and precisely.   
Monetary policy is in this case relatively straightforward, outright:   
application of a unique main monetary instrument 
 
unique operational objective 
 
unique nominal anchor (i.e. unique final goal) 
Implicit inflation targeting 
Central bank fulfils only some aspects of five above-mentioned elements of inflation 
targeting in this monetary strategy. Monetary authority realises sort term and explicit 
predictions. It sets value of final goals in short term in implicit way, i.e. not officially. It does 
not have to meet targeted value so strictly and precisely. There is not such a big public 
control.  
 
Monetary policy is in this case less straightforward, outright: 
application of several main monetary instruments 
 
mixed package of operational objectives 
 
several nominal anchors (i.e. several final goals) 
 
Main reason for implication of implicit inflation targeting instead of explicit one is partial 
or complete absence of necessary conditions for monetary strategy in the form of inflation 
strategy. Central bank has for instance insufficient knowledge about transmission channels, 
thus it applies several instruments and goals.  
Implicit inflation targeting should be just temporary strategy before implementation of 
proper explicit inflation targeting. 
Obstacles of inflation targeting implementation 
Economies in the process of transition usually have to face several obstacles, therefore 
they can not implement inflation targeting from the very beginning. Frequent obstacles for a 
small and open economy in transition can be following: 
• Small and open economy is much more vulnerable to external chocks in 
comparison with other countries. Thus, it is more complicated to forecast 
macroeconomic evolution and to maintain external stability of the economy, for 
instance exchange rate. Transition countries have to face numerous unusual 
chocks because of the transition process itself (e.g. price deregulations, political 
and social changes).  
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• Other complications in predicting are connected with short time ranks of 
transition economies. These economies have at their disposal relevant 
macroeconomic data only after implementation of market economy. However, 
these difficulties will be gradually eliminated.  
• Insufficient understanding of the channels of monetary transmission represents 
another obstacle for inflation targeting.  
• During first years of transitions, central banks prefer more often administrative 
monetary instruments in comparison to direct, i.e. market instruments. However, 
according to economic practise as well as economic theory, application of 
administrative instruments is considered to be less effective than application of 
market instruments. Though, overall employment of market instruments is not 
possible from the very beginning as financial markets, systems and institutions 
are not sufficiently developed as it would be desirable.  
• Less developed and less stable financial markets cause changes in price signals of 
assets. Price changes do not provide enough information; even some signals about 
economic fundaments and market expectations can be incorrect.  
• Fiscal policy should be in harmony with central bank monetary policy. Otherwise, 
achieving of targeted objectives and goals is more complicated. Monetary strategy 
in the form of inflation targeting can hardly exist in such a heterogeneous 
environment.   
• Very important obstacle of inflation targeting is impossibility to control fully final 
goal by central bank. If the final goal of price stability is expressed through e.g. 
consumer price index (CPI) and changes in indirect taxes, price deregulations and 
other modifications are often realised by government, central bank can control 
and influence just small fraction of CPI. In the case of transition countries changes 
in indirect taxes and price deregulations are usually very frequent. Thus, some 
countries target rather core or net inflation. For instance, Check Republic at the 
beginning of inflation targeting, i.e. since 1998 aimed index of net inflation. Since 
April 2001 Czech National Bank targets overall inflation through consumer price 
index (CPI), and since 2004, after joining European Union through harmonised 
CPI (CNB 2006). Changes in net or core inflation are easier to predict than changes 
in overall inflation. However, indicators of core or net inflation are less 
understandable and accountable for public. This is in conflict with basic condition 
of transparency in inflation targeting. Thus, some countries target overall inflation 
from the very beginning as e.g. Poland since 1998 (Brucháčová 2000, 26). Basically, 
choice of inflation targeting indicator is a compromise between transparency and 
responsibility of central bank. If central bank chooses indicator of net or core 
inflation, its goal is mostly long-term trend of inflation evolution. Choice of 
overall CPI indicator means that central bank wants to reduce even short-term 
inflation fluctuations.  
Evaluation of inflation targeting in chosen countries 
If inflation targeting is applied when an economy is ready to meet above mentioned 
obstacles, it can lead to positive effects. However, declared targeting sometimes differs from 
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real inflation rate. In the figure 3 we can compare success in inflation targeting in the Czech 
and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland.  
There is the smallest difference between targeted and real inflation in the case of 
Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, real inflation was lower than targeted one at the beginning 
of inflation targeting, respectively, real inflation was situated in the lower part of targeted 
zone. Opposite evolution was in Hungary where real inflation was in the upper part of the 
targeted zone or above it. Polish central bank managed to fulfil its goal only twice during 
nine year targeting. 
 
Figure 3. Inflation targeting in Visegrad countries 
 
 
 
 
Success of inflation targeting depends on common effort of central government and 
monetary authority. The Republic of Serbia has implemented inflation targeting since 
January 1, 2009 following Memorandum on the New Monetary Policy Framework adopted 
in August 2006 (National Bank of Serbia 2008, 2). It declares coordination in economic policy. 
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Basic conditions for efficient targeting are fulfilled, however only reality will be able to test 
its capacity. 
Conclusion 
Exchange rate targeting seems to be an efficient measurement in stabilisation of inflation 
in countries in transition. However, it is necessary to choose a suitable foreign currency to 
which the domestic currency is anchored. Combination of exchange rate targeting with 
monetary targeting can be even more successful. Inflation targeting increases transparency of 
central bank policy and in general, it enables to reduce inflation rate even more. Yet it can be 
applied only if a certain level of macroeconomic stabilisation is already achieved and if there 
is a common effort of government and central bank to meet targeted goals.  
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